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ABSTRACT
Cognitive biases are systematic errors in judgment. Researchers in
data visualizations have explored whether cognitive biases transfer
to decision-making tasks with interactive data visualizations. At the
same time, cognitive scientists have reinterpreted cognitive biases
as the product of resource-rational strategies under finite time and
computational costs. In this paper, we argue for the integration of
resource-rational analysis through constrained Bayesian cognitive
modeling to understand cognitive biases in data visualizations. The
benefit would be a more realistic “bounded rationality” representa-
tion of data visualization users and provides a research roadmap for
studying cognitive biases in data visualizations through a feedback
loop between future experiments and theory.
Index Terms: Human-centered computing—Visualization—
Visualization theory, concepts and paradigms
1 INTRODUCTION
Recently data visualization researchers have investigated whether
cognitive biases transfer to decision-making with interactive visual
interfaces and explored strategies to mitigate them [1, 2, 4, 41, 42]. A
large portion of this work involves collecting and analyzing empirical
evidence on the effect of different cognitive biases through user
experiments. These studies generally are motivated by the classical
psychological approach to cognitive biases, i.e., the “heuristic and
biases” framework [31] introduced by Tversky and Kahneman [32,
33]. While these studies provide great value to the visualization
community on illuminating the effect of cognitive biases on visual
analysis tasks, they do not include quantitative cognitive models that
yield explicit testable hypotheses predicting users’ behavior under
different experiment conditions. Moreover, they tend to ignore
critiques that heuristics which lead to biased judgments actually
reflect the rational use of limited cognitive resources [8].
Adopting cognitive modeling for data visualization research can
provide many opportunities to accelerate innovation, improve va-
lidity, and facilitate replication efforts [22]. Early examples to un-
derstand cognitive processes while using data visualizations con-
sider sensemaking approaches [9] or visual attention coupled with
decision-making [23]. However, a drawback of past Vis cognitive
frameworks [9, 23, 25] is they are typically descriptive or “process”
diagrams. As such, they lack the level of detail necessary to make
detailed quantitative predictions or to generate strong hypotheses
about behavior [7]. This complicates efforts to predict when cog-
nitive biases will impact how people interpret and make decisions
from visualizations.
One area of opportunity is Bayesian cognitive modeling for data
visualizations [12, 14, 43]. These models rest on the claim that
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people reason under uncertainty in accordance with the principles
of Bayesian inference [10]. This approach is appealing because it
provides a normative framework for how people should reason and
make decisions from information under uncertainty. However, in
practice people may behave in ways that are inconsistent with the
predictions of Bayesian models, often due to well-known limitations
in cognitive capacity, including constraints in time, which are com-
mon in many visualization studies and tasks. Existing applications of
Bayesian cognitive modeling to information visualization have not
yet acknowledged these limitations like bounded rationality [29, 30].
Specifically, we’d like to note gaps and disconnect among current
efforts in studying the effect of cognitive biases in interactive data
visualizations. A promising approach from cognitive science is the
resource-rational analysis of cognitive biases as a way to under-
stand rational trade-offs between judgment accuracy and the mind’s
limited resources, including fixed time [10, 16, 17]. In this paper, we
argue that resource-rational analysis can provide a framework for
many cognitive biases in data visualizations while providing a quan-
titative theoretical framework, or “research roadmap,” that enables
a feedback loop to add realism through further constraints. Such
a roadmap may not only better identify cognitive biases’ effects in
data visualization decision-making but may also provide a means
for mitigating these biases before they occur.
2 COGNITIVE BIAS IN INTERACTIVE DATA VISUALIZATIONS
Cognitive biases are systematic errors (or deviations) in judgment
[16, 33]. They have been studied by cognitive psychologists and
social scientists to understand how and why individuals sometimes
make consistent errors in decision-making. Recently, data visualiza-
tion researchers have explored the role of cognitive biases transfer to
data visualization decision-making [4,36,41] and, if such biases can
be identified, how these findings could inform the design of visual-
izations systems that can debias or mitigate such effects [2,5,24,26].
If a well-designed system can help users to find the right explore-
exploit mix [11], ideally such a system would safeguard against
possible forking path problems [27, 44] and mitigate systematic
errors and enable better decision-making.
Data visualization research in cognitive biases tend to focus on
either empirical studies or frameworks with little interaction between
them. Empirical studies try to demonstrate evidence of traditional
cognitive biases through data visualization user studies, typically
analyzing user’s interaction behaviors or decisions [1–3, 13, 35, 42].
Alternatively, general descriptive frameworks (like taxonomies) have
been introduced for cognitive biases [4, 41]; however, these tend to
broadly cover many human biases [36, 40] and are limited in their
ability to provide testable predictions for empirical studies.
Cognitive science has a long history of studying visualization cog-
nition as a subset of visuospatial reasoning, in how individuals derive
meaning from visual (external) representations [34]. Typically, these
models either focused on perception and/or prior knowledge [23].
More recently, data visualization researchers have integrated sim-
ilar ideas to understand visualization cognitive processes through
insight-based approaches [9] and top-down modeling [19, 25]. How-
ever, past visualization cognitive models tend to be based on verbal
“process” diagrams, and are not quantitative models that yield ex-
plicit testable hypotheses. Without such quantitative predictions,
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implications of the models can be vague, difficult to simulate, and
even more difficult to test and refine.
Bayesian cognitive modeling is a promising approach to studying
cognitive biases [43]. Building on work in cognitive science, Wu et
al. first argued that Bayesian cognitive modeling provides a means
to model many irrational behaviors like cognitive biases in a “princi-
pled” way. Building from their work, Kim et al. [14] and Karduni
et al. [12] have provided further extensions on studying Bayesian
cognitive modeling for data visualizations. In particular, by elicit-
ing each user’s prior belief about an uncertain relationship, these
studies have used Bayesian models to predict how people should
update those beliefs in response to data visualizations. Although
these two studies provide novel elicitation methods with Bayesian
cognitive models in data visualization, they do not directly connect
such approaches with experiment designs to identify cognitive biases.
Moreover, they do not incorporate realistic constraints on users (e.g.,
time or memory limits) in their modeling or experiment. This is
where resource-rational analysis may remedy these shortcomings.
3 RESOURCE-RATIONAL ANALYSIS
Classical approaches to understand rationality [21, 45] assume indi-
viduals incorporate utility theory [37] to maximize their expected
utility. Simon [29, 30] challenged this notion with bounded ratio-
nality, the idea that rational decisions must be framed in the context
of the environment and one’s limited cognitive resources. Whereas
normative rational models exist on Marr’s computational level [20]
(i.e., on the structure of the problem), bounded rationality connects
Marr’s computational level and the algorithmic level (e.g., repre-
sentation and transformation) as human cognition involves making
approximations from a normative rational model [10, 15]. The prob-
lem is studying each level separately is insufficient to explain the
underlying mechanisms in human intelligence [15].
To address this problem, Lieder and Griffiths [15–17] introduce
resource-rational analysis as rational models that bridge the ide-
alized, unbounded computational level to a more realistic, highly
resource-constrained algorithmic level. As an iterative process, a
rational model can be modified over time to move closer towards
a more realistic model of individuals’ true cognitive resources and
processes. Figure 1 outlines the five steps in resource-rational anal-
ysis. Like other rational theories, resource-rational theory posits
that there exists some optimal solution yielded by the rules of ex-
pected utility theory, Bayesian inference, and standard rules of logic
(Step 1 in Fig. 1). However, bounded rationality limits the space of
feasible decisions that are possible given the cognitive constraints
which lead to approximate models of rationality (Step 2). Instead,
resource rationality is the optimal algorithm under this constraint
(Step 3) which then yield testable predictions (Step 4). In this way,
resource-rational analysis reinterprets cognitive biases as an opti-
mal (rational) tradeoff between external task demands and internal
cognitive constraints (e.g., cost of error in judgment vs. time cost
to reduce this error) [18]. This rational interpretation reconciles
with Gigerenzer’s criticism of cognitive biases as irrational use of
heuristics as rational [8].
3.1 Example: Anchoring Bias
One popular cognitive bias that has been studied in multiple visual-
ization experiments is anchoring bias [1, 35, 39, 42]. Anchoring bias
is the tendency for an initial piece of information, relevant or not, to
effect a decision-making process [33]. Typically, this is followed
by an adjustment in response to new information which falls short
of the normative judgment (the anchoring-and-adjustment effect).
Anchoring-and-adjustment approach posits a two step process [6].
In the first step, a person will develop their estimate, or anchor, of
an open-ended question. In the second step, the person will adjust
her estimate as new information is processed. Error occurs when
she does fails to make a sufficient adjustment to the correct answer.
Figure 1: Flow diagram of five steps of the resource-rational analysis
process adapted from Lieder and Griffiths [15].
Lieder and Griffiths [17] examined anchoring bias through the
lens of resource-rational analysis. Following Figure 1, they formu-
late the problem through Bayesian decision theory for numerical esti-
mation, the classical task associated with anchoring-and-adjustment
[6, 33]. They assume that the mind approximates Bayesian infer-
ence through sampling algorithms, which represent probabilistic
beliefs through a small number of randomly selected hypotheses
proportional to their actual prevalence [38]. More specifically, they
posit that sampling occurs through Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC), a popular algorithm in statistics and artificial intelligence.
The advantage of this approach is that it provides testable pre-
dictions that can be considered empirically through controlled ex-
perimentation (Step 4 in Fig. 1). The model predicts that scenarios
in which there are high time costs and no error costs, result in the
highest degree of anchoring bias as participants have a much higher
cost for each adjustment but less concern for accuracy (or error).
Therefore, in such situations participants will tend to have more bias
(absolute distance). This occurs as participants have zero adjust-
ments and favor their anchor (provided or self-generated) as time
costs are critical. To test this model, Lieder et al. [18] developed
an empirical experiment on MTurk for estimating bus arrival under
four different scenarios. They find strong evidence for resource
rationality adjustment as the degree of anchoring bias varied based
on different time and error costs. Moreover, they find that incentives
can be effective at reducing anchoring bias even with self-generated
and provided anchors, contrary to Epley and Gilovich [6].
4 FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
Resource-rational analysis could be beneficial in data visualization
studies in which users are faced with meaningful cost-benefit trade-
offs in interpreting the visualization. In other words, experiments
where additional effort leads to a more accurate decisions from the
data. This would especially be the case for system in which sam-
pling occurs over time, either directly sampling information from a
display, or sampling alternative states/outcomes in the user’s mental
model. In the context of visualizing hurricane paths [28], users
might at first overweight the risks of salient negative outcomes (e.g.,
a direct hit on New Orleans), but with more time (or different type
of visualization?) arrive at a better calibrated estimate of the risk.
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